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IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MOTOR INDUSTRY
David Duncan
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i) Introduction
When one looks back over all those years, it was very interesting, because you
saw the growth of an industry here - you were part of it, so it was quite
exciting.2
This paper is part of a research project on the history of the motor industry in South
Africa from the 1920s to the present. The broader study looks at all aspects of the industry,
from government policy, through foreign and local investment, to the organisation of
production and labour relations. It takes in both the assembly sector (or, as they prefer to be
called, the vehicle manufacturers) and the components sector (the parts manufacturers).
Research in the social sciences has tended to be polarised between analyses of
resistance against the apartheid regime and studies of the state itself. Where academic
treatises have broached the topic of industry, it has been the owners of the means of
production, the capitalists themselves, who have constituted the focus of attention.3 This
essay deals mainly with the next rung in the business ladder - the senior and middle
managers who actually run capitalist enterprises from year to year. It attempts a general
survey of the historical development of management culture and attitudes in the motor
industry. A later paper will compare and contrast these attitudes with those of shop floor
workers.
Both the title and the opening quotation are the words of chief executives in the
assembly and components sectors respectively. As the quotes imply, motor industry managers
have a sense of common identity, a feeling of belonging in the industry which goes beyond
the cut-throat competition between individual firms. Although the industry is deeply divided
vertically and horizontally, managers see themselves as being part of a larger entity. This
perception is reinforced by the high degree of racial and gender homogeneity in the industry -
the vast majority of managers are white males, and while many are from an Afrikaans or (to
a lesser extent) German-speaking background, the lingua franca is almost universally English.
More complex reasons for this sense of common identity and their implications for the future
of the industry are explored below.
The various facets of management attitudes reinforce each other; indeed, any attempt
to classify aspects of a group's consciousness is, to some extent, artificial. Nevertheless, for
the sake of explaining the basic pillars of management culture, I have divided this paper into
four substantive sections. Section (ii) gives a brief history of the industry from its
establishment in the 1920s to the early 1990s. The next section analyses the impact of
successive waves of foreign companies and management practices on South African
executives. To balance this, section (iv) focuses on influences which originate in South
African society. The final section examines how management attitudes have responded to and
been shaped by the growth of a vibrant trade union movement since the late 1960s.
The paper is largely empirical in content. It is based on fifty interviews with senior
managers in the assembly and components sectors. These are supplemented by archival
material from state and trade union collections, published reports and newspaper and
magazine articles. The argument is in no sense offered as the last word on this topic; rather,
it is a preliminary and tentative bid to explain the consciousness of motor industry managers
in its historical context. As Drechsel and Schmidt indicate in a recent paper, overall cultural
and institutional changes impinge heavily on the rationality of a given economic system.4
In order to find answers to the enormous problems which the motor industry currently faces,
it is essential to unpack the attitudes which management and labour bring to work with them
each day.
ii) The Motor Vehicle Industry in South Africa
The development of the South African motor industry has gone hand in hand with
what some writers have termed racial Fordism - a racially structured extension of mass
production and mass consumption.5 The industry had its origins nearly seventy years ago:
Ford (through its Canadian subsidiary) set up an assembly plant in Port Elizabeth in the
Eastern Cape in 1924 and General Motors (GM) came to the same city two years later. The
government promised to protect the motor assembly industry.6 As part of a series of import
substitution tariffs introduced in the mid-1920s, General Hertzog's National/Labour Party
coalition government allowed imports of completely knocked down (CKD) or unassembled
kits at lower rates than fully built up (FBU) or assembled units. In return, there was an
understanding that the assemblers would employ white labour - a mark of pride amongst Ford
and GM, who boasted this fact in their advertisements. Local capital established a further
franchise assembly operation in 1939, but the major American manufacturers reigned supreme
in South Africa until after World War II.
In the late 1940s, the government, desperate to save foreign exchange, introduced
import controls. This led to a sudden expansion in the number of assemblers - three more
locally owned assemblers set up and Chrysler invested in its own plant by 1949; the British
Motor Corporation followed in the 1950s. Most assembly operations remained in the major
coastal ports, with a few in the Transvaal. British models (later joined by French and Italian
vehicles) predominated as the dollar shortage precluded imports from North America.7 In
the post-war period, rising white living standards forced the assemblers to take on Africans
and 'coloureds' (people of mixed race) to keep down the price of unskilled and semi-skilled
work. Whites retained control of management, skilled work and most supervisory positions.
The government finally withdrew import controls in 1957. The result was a massive
increase in vehicle sales, from 35,659 in 1954 to 106,793 in 1957 (see appendix). Once
again, the fear of foreign exchange losses drove the government into action. A 1960 report
by the Board of Trade and Industry recommended the creation of a components manufacturing
industry to broaden South Africa's industrial base and save foreign exchange.8 The
government duly brought in a local content programme: from 1964, assemblers had to ensure
that a per centage of the mass of a passenger vehicle was made in South Africa in order to
qualify for rebates on excise duties. Before local content, only a few 'hang-on' parts, such
as batteries and light bulbs, were typically made in South Africa. By 1971, the government
had raised the required per centage of local content by mass to fifty-five per cent and from
1977, to sixty-six per cent.9 The state extended weight-based local content to commercial
vehicles from 1980.
The economists who devised the plans anticipated that steady increases in local content
requirements would force a reduction in the number of assemblers in South Africa.10 Much
to their surprise, the opposite happened: existing assemblers announced ambitious investment
programmes. Other motor manufacturers set up shop locally for the first time, with German
investment now rising sharply. Still more (among them Datsun-Nissan and Toyota) allowed
local interests to assemble vehicles on a licence basis. After the brief period of political
instability in the early 1960s - the years of the Sharpeville massacre (1960) and the banning
of the African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress (1964) - the global motor
mdustry showed its faith in the ability of the apartheid state to keep political protest and
labour militancy under control. By 1973, there were twelve separate assembly operations in
South Africa, employing some 34,800 people.11 The expansion of the assembly industry
underlined the determination of global manufacturers to ensure their share of the expanding
South African market.
Alongside the assembly plants, the components industry grew from minuscule
proportions in 1960 to employ over 30,000 by 1973. The mass-based local content
programme encouraged vehicle assemblers to source heavy components, such as body panels
and engine blocks, from local manufacturers. The components industry was in a sense doubly
protected: it supplied both the original equipment (OE) market and a vast replacement market.
Although sales of new vehicles to Africans have never been more than 1.1 per cent of total
sales a year, the market for used vehicles has grown enormously. This has greatly augmented
the demand for replacement components. Very few components manufacturers could have
competed internationally; but in the protected South African market, they have thrived.
The motor industry reached its peak in 1981, when total new vehicle sales climbed to
453,451 (from 314,067 in 1979). Tins was closely related to wider economic developments:
the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 set the prices of oil and gold soaring; as a massive inflow
of foreign capital from gold profits hit South Africa, white consumers and fleet-buyers sold
off their gas-guzzling cars and bought new, fuel-efficient vehicles. The industry's main
problems in 1980-1 were how to increase production and how to conceal profits from the
taxman.12 Much more serious difficulties were just around the comer. Already in 1979,
new legislation allowed black unions to operate legally. From 1980, a series of strikes hit the
assembly plants as the rejuvenated motor unions began to flex their muscles.13 Just as pay
levels were at last beginning to approach a living wage, the influx of gold earnings drove
inflation up. The general economic slump worsened as the townships erupted in anti-
apartheid protests from 1984. Foreign investment dried up; the sanctions movement gathered
momentum and leant on companies doing business in South Africa. Combined political
pressure from the international anti-apartheid movement and the deepening recession
triggered a series of spectacular disinvestments, the most important being those of Ford and
General Motors. By 1989, withdrawals and mergers left only seven players: BMW and
Volkswagen (wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries), Mercedes-Benz (majority-owned foreign
subsidiary), Toyota SA (locally-owned), Samcor (majority-owned by Anglo-American,
producing Fords, Mazdas, and Mitsubishis), Nissan SA (owned by the financial house Sanlam,
producing Nissans and, from 1990, the Fiat Uno) and Delta (management-owned, producing
Opels and Isuzus). New vehicle sales were static at just over 350,000; 37,000 people were
employed in the assembling plants and some 73,000 in the components sector.14
Battered by the crises of the 1980s, the vehicle assembly and components
manufacturing industries now faced their greatest challenge of all in the form of new
government regulations. By 1989, the National Party government of P.W. Botha was
embracing 'free market' principles as a new ideology to see it through stormy political
weather. More narrowly, the Department of Trade and Industry felt the motor industry was
using too much foreign exchange at a time when South Africa's access to money markets was
uncertain.15 In March 1989, the government introduced Phase VI - a new version of local
content based on value, not mass. Phase VI measures local content as the value of a new car
minus the value of imported components. The programme strongly encourages exports of
both components and FBU units by a system of rebates on excise duties. The more
assemblers export (or the more export credits they purchase from component manufacturers),
the fewer components they have to put into locally-sold vehicles. The sudden removal of
protection for relatively-low cost, heavy components naturally threatens the companies which
produce them, not to mention workers in the parts sector.16 In fact, the entire industry is
undergoing massive restructuring as management re-jig their operations to suit the new
regulations.
iii) Foreign Influences on Local Management
Since the 1920s, successive waves of foreign investors, managers and management
philosophies have come to South Africa. The initial wave was North American, beginning
with the arrival of Ford's H.FA. Stockelbach in 1923 and GM's N.C. Tuxbury two years later.
By the mid-1920s, Henry Ford and Alfred Sloan had already established mass production in
Ford and GM's North American auto plants.17 The essence of the system was to ensure
economies of scale through long production runs on moving assembly lines. Workers
received relatively high wages, though the work was mindless and repetitive and in hard
times, the companies laid off labour until the market improved. Management retained control
over even the most basic operational decisions. Both Ford and GM developed huge
bureaucracies to run their concerns, with careful job demarcation to cover the myriad of
managerial responsibilities. Mass production gave the two companies great advantages over
their domestic and international competitors. Between the wars, they invested in factories
throughout the world to assemble parts made at their main plants.
South African manufacturers became aware of the potential benefits of mass
production in the 1920s, but the scale of output in South Africa remained very small.18 The
assembly plants set up in Port Elizabeth - "the Detroit of South Africa" - were tiny cogs in
Ford and GM's global operations.19 The market was insignificant in terms of world sales
and the assembly plants did not introduce moving assembly lines until after World War II.
Even so, the North American executives who came to the Eastern Cape replicated many of
the managerial practices they had learnt at home. The plants took on semi-rural, unskilled
white labour and laid off employees when there was no work to be done.20 The expatriate
managers organised production on the same lines as assembly plants in the USA, with
separate lines for the engines, chassis and body, and quality inspectors at every station. Both
firms built new factories in the late 1940s, expanding further with engine plants after 1961
when the government introduced its local content programme.21
Expatriate managers held all the important positions in the plants. Outside the
factories, the North Americans established themselves as a social elite - they lived in large
houses in the best parts of the city and had little contact with their South African colleagues.
The wives had their own social club in Port Elizabeth; the men were very status conscious,
flaunting their wealth through conspicuous consumption. As one former GM director put it:
"We used to feel sorry for them in a way - they were really like children - very
immature".22 Exiled in South Africa, the American and Canadian expatriates recreated some
of the social patterns which they had been used to at home. The locals expressed disdain,
though in positions of power, their own aspirations and behaviour were not so different. On
the contrary, South African managers have long relished feeling part of an international class
of motor executives, with links to the heartlands of the developed world.
South African managers adopted many of the features of North American management
as they became incorporated into an expanded motor industry after World War II. Like their
North American counterparts, the South Africans who entered the industry tended to remain
in it throughout their careers. South African motor executives also adopted the high profile
which leading North American managers assumed, encouraging the public to identify a
particular company with one name. The intense rivalry which is still a way of life in Detroit
was transferred to South Africa, though socially, managers from Ford, GM and other
assemblers were much closer than their counterparts in the USA. Within plants, South
African management maintained a careful delimitation of responsibilities between labour and
management and between executives in finance, marketing and production. Meanwhile, until
the 1960s, the managers of all the assembly operations did their best to restrict labour
mobilisation. A harsh style of management prevailed, with workers hired and fired at will
and pay rates determined unilaterally by management.
The more humane face of American management was its introduction of social welfare
functions for company employees. The big American plants led the way in the late 1940s by
creating medical aid schemes, pension plans, workers' sports leagues, social clubs and
canteens.23 Yet management at Ford and GM did not challenge the government's apartheid
policies. They protested against the application of coloured preference laws and job
reservation only in so far as they affected the supply of labour. They continued to make use
of anti-union legislation through the 1960s. Both firms tendered for defence contracts despite
United Nations sanctions against supplying South Africa with military equipment. It was only
in the late 1960s, as anti-discriminatory pressures began to emanate from the USA, that the
firms introduced affirmative action programmes and desegregated facilities for shop floor
workers.
North American managerial styles spread throughout the motor industry as other
assemblers (including Chrysler) entered the market from the 1940s, and once American firms
invested in the components sector in the 1960s. The chief disseminators of American
managerial practices were former Ford managers. Ford had put considerable time and money
into training local managers from the late 1940s onwards. By the 1960s, its share of the local
market was declining and American companies were becoming wary of offending the anti-
apartheid lobby in the USA by investing further capital in South Africa. Armed with sound
training and international experience, Ford-trained South Africans spread throughout the
industry. Even today, Ford "old-boys'" networks exist within most of the vehicle
manufacturing operations.24
Although they had tried to gain access to the South African market in the 1930s, it
was not until the late 1940s that the British made serious in-roads. From 1947 through the
1950s, British cars (including UK-sourced models from Ford, GM and Chrysler) reigned
supreme.25 In the 1960s, local content and a rapidly growing vehicle market brought even
more British investment in both the assembly and parts sectors. British managers and skilled
workers emigrated to South Africa from the late 1940s onwards and established a strong
presence throughout the industry.26
At the technical level, the British contribution to the South African motor industry was
hugely beneficial. British artisans and production engineers advanced the industry's
technological capability enormously. On the other hand, the British influence on managerial
practices and cultures was not entirely positive. British society has long tended to regard
manufacturing and technical work as infra dig. - the dominant institutions in the UK are
financial, and careers in banking, insurance, accountancy, and administration are exalted
above careers in production. South African society (both white and black) has adopted this
prejudice, with a resulting shortage of experienced engineers. Many South African engineers
have tried to move into managerial and administrative posts as quickly as possible. The racial
divisions in South African society have exacerbated the problem as technical careers have
been associated with blue-collar work traditionally performed by oppressed races.
A further effect of British influence was to widen the existing gap between
management and labour on the shop floor. In the UK, deep divisions existed between
management and the workforce. To quote one managing-director:
How many of us left England because we had to fill dead men's shoes? Our
management styles were outdated. When I left England it was pathetic. There
was no participation - it was the bosses and the unions - they couldn't get
together. They divided the industry and they screwed it up.27
The plight of British companies in the post-war South African motor industry does
not suggest that British managers found it any easier to bridge the management-labour gap
in South Africa than they had at home. From the lion's share of the market in 1955, the
British presence declined steadily until 1982, when the last remaining British assembler,
British Leyland, pulled out of the South African market altogether.
A third negative feature which also brings in French and Italian companies concerns
the "get-rich-quick" attitude adopted by a number of European firms in South Africa in the
1960s and 1970s.28 Local content and a rapidly expanding economy prompted much greater
investment than the South African market could bear. Rather than investing for long term
profitability, companies expected an immediate return on their capital. The result was a series
of mergers and withdrawals from the late 1960s onwards, culminating in the closure of entire
assembly operations in the 1980s. A lack of vision beyond the individual company's product
planning has remained an obstacle in the South African motor industry. South African
managers have proved extremely adept at turning a profit in a tight market; but the industry
has signally failed to develop coherent plans for its long term future.
It would be wrong to single out the British for failing to pay enough attention to
engineering disciplines or for distanced labour/management relations; equally, the British,
French and Italians are not solely responsible for the short-sightedness and lack of careful
planning in the industry. At the same time, they certainly contributed to attitudes adopted by
South African motor managers. In recent years, though, the predominant foreign influences
have shifted as German and Japanese-licensed companies have overwhelmed other OE
manufacturers and taken a large slice of the components sector.
Once the "Deutsche Wirtshaftswunder" was firmly underway, German companies
gradually extended their investments in South Africa. Volkswagen gained a controlling
interest in a Uitenhagc assembly plant in 1956; Daimler Benz took over an East London
during the 1960s; BMW bought out a plant at Rosslyn in the early 1970s. All the German-
owned assemblers and major component firms (such as Bosch and Laepple) have had a strong
German presence on their boards. Like Ford and GM, the German parent companies have
controlled their subsidiaries fairly closely.29 Unlike the Americans, they have remained
heavily committed to the South African market through a decade of sanctions pressures,
stagnating sales and worker militancy. The Germans have taken a long term view of the
market's potential. They have put up with heavy capital investment and been content with
relatively low profit margins. TTie German element in South African managerial ranks - both
as contract employees and as permanent residents in this country - has significantly bolstered
South African production capabilities. The expatriates are often highly experienced in
production, with a strong background in engineering. BMW, Mercedes Benz and Volkswagen
set great store in sending local engineers and technical staff to Germany for further
training.30
On the negative side, the German presence helps to skew the market towards very
expensive, high-tech products. German subsidiaries follow source slavishly; with the
exception of some Volkswagen models, their products are geared for a market dominated by
corporate buying. To an extent, this may have shaped motor managers' self-perceptions in
the industry as a whole - they see themselves as producing for an elite, rather than a mass
market. The fact that parent companies are unlikely to approve radical departures from
current practice discourages innovation in their South African subsidiaries.
The final foreign influence which has impacted on South African motor industry
managers comes from Japan. Japanese "bakkies" first appeared in this country in the late
1950s, with franchised assembly beginning a few years later. However, it is only in the last
fifteen years that South African management has appreciated the revolution which Japanese
management philosophies are causing in the global motor industry.31 Rather than taking
responsibility away from the shop floor workers, Japanese managers make workers themselves
responsible for their own tasks. Companies do away with job demarcations as far as possible;
a highly trained workforce is multi-skilled to perform many different tasks. The objective
is to make production flexible and "lean". Suppliers deliver components as and when they
are needed and assembly plants produce vehicles in accordance with daily orders from their
dealers. The trade-offs for labour operating in a high stress environment are profit-sharing,
a greater variety of work, jobs-for-life and open-ended career prospects. Companies expect
absolute commitment from all their workers.
In South Africa in the 1980s, Toyota's Durban plant (run by Ralph Broadley, a former
Ford production engineer) took the lead in implementing aspects of lean management.32 The
locally-owned company succeeded in reducing stocks and improving quality and productivity
in the plant. Managers of other assembly plants have followed; Nissan now boasts lean
production methods on its television commercials and every manager in the country is talking
of improving quality, productivity and reliability of supply. Nevertheless, many managers are
doubtful about the prospects of making their operations lean.33 They see South Africa as
barren soil for production and labour processes honed in Nagoya and Osaka. They believe
small volumes and labour militancy hinder improvements in quality and productivity. This
is partly because South African managers have had little direct contact with lean production
methods; their practices and perceptions have been heavily influenced by previous generations
of overseas investors. Management's appropriation of other foreign influences over the past
seventy years may yet prove an obstacle in the industry's current efforts to close the
productivity gap with the rest of the world.
iv) South African Society and Management Consciousness
Even more important than foreign pressures in moulding management consciousness
in the motor industry has been the impact of local societal factors. Most managers are South
African, bom and bred; the patterns and prejudices of this country have been crucial in
constituting their sense of identity. The most obvious elements in that identity involve race,
class and gender. This section consider these determinants and then outlines the most
significant political and economic components of local management culture.
Until the 1970s, it did not occur to manufacturers to fill management positions with
women or black people. Even if employers had been committed to non-discriminatory hiring
policies, it is highly unlikely that any women or blacks would have had the skills or
experience necessary for the job. There have been glimmerings of change in recent years,
but even after two decades of publicly-stated commitment to promoting people of colour,
white males still hold the vast majority of senior- and middle-management positions in the
motor industry. The structure of South African education has played a central role in
protecting the white hegemony in management. Most local managers have traditionally been
drawn from university and technikon graduates in commerce, accountancy and engineering
(a few have entered the professional classes the hard way, by promotion from artisanal
positions). Men are still in the majority in all of these disciplines.
A combination of declining incomes and the assertion of women's rights have brought
more women into the professions since the 1960s. However, they have tended to choose
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teaching, law and medicine in preference to engineering and commerce. Where women have
entered the business world, they have often opted for small enterprises rather than the larger
corporate and industrial firms. For black people, outright prohibitions on entering most
tertiary institutions kept numbers to a minimum until the 1980s. More recently, poor primary
and secondary schooling (especially in mathematics and science) has been the major factor
in denying people of colour access to those disciplines.
The entrenched position of white men in the industry has taken on a momentum of
its own. Part of the reason why so few women and black people have tried to enter
managerial ranks in the motor industry, is because they correctly perceive the industry to be
a bastion of white male dominance. Sexism and racism have been a part of South African
social mores for centuries; even where they can be proven to be bad for business, or where
companies have come under pressure from overseas to adopt "positive" discrimination
policies, ingrained prejudices have discouraged firms from breaking with traditional hiring
patterns. The most senior woman in the industry, the Vice-Chairman of Toyota, insists that
she came by the position through a very unusual route (she was secretary to her father who
founded the company).34 The recent, high-profile resignation of Wendy Luhabe, a middle
manager in BMW's Marketing Division, has also underlined the difficulties women and black
people face in scaling the heights of senior management.33
Management in the industry is still fairly tight-knit. The majority of managers are
born into the middle classes and go through the same sorts of training in engineering,
commerce and accountancy. They spend their entire careers in an industry controlled by
seven main assemblers and approximately 150 component firms. Their sons often follow
them into the motor business and sometimes into the same firm. Motor industry executives
come into constant contact with each other via inter-company trading in the thousands of
different vehicle parts made in South Africa. Since 1989, the component firms and
assemblers have established new lines of contact through the sale of export credits under the
government's export incentive scheme. They also meet each other frequently through
lobbying and negotiations coordinated by their representative organisations or at vehicle
launches, trade fairs and conferences.36 Managers are often members of the same clubs and
address business matters in informal social circumstances. Within this cohesive social
grouping, managers display a common contempt for lesser callings, such as parts distributors,
garage proprietors and dealers.
The industry's maleness and exclusivity is underlined by certain shared values. In
South African society as a whole, a keen interest in cars has long been a largely male
preserve. From childhood, the power, speed and performance of their vehicle is, for many
males, an extension or refinement of more basic forms of inter-male competitiveness.37
Cars are unique in their combination of aesthetic qualities and sophisticated technology (both
in the process of manufacturing and in the end product). Most motor managers have a
heightened enthusiasm for their product as an object of desire and are keenly aware that cars
are crucial status symbols in South African society. To quote one industry executive:
For a start, if during the sanctions years high-tech cars were not available in
SA, the brain drain from this country would at least have doubled... Far from
being a symbol of extravagance, the high-tech car has an extremely important
role to play as a symbol of aspiration to entrepreneurs and managers, who
should be encouraged to aspire to greater and greater heights because this, in
turn, not only creates wealth for the nation but also increases employment
opportunities - something this country needs so badly.38
A common wish to be associated with this "symbol of aspiration" is one reason why
managers enter the industry and remain in it throughout their working lives. In the motor
industry, the car itself takes its place alongside broader middle class, male status symbols
such as power, professional skills and earning capacity.
A further explanation of the enthusiasm which motor management have for their
industry lies in the fierce competition in the South African market for new vehicles. No other
country in the world has seen such a vast array of assemblers competing for a small market
on more or less equal terms. Since the late 1940s, South African managers have found that
highly competitive environment stimulating. Confronted with the challenge of staying in
business, they have become very sophisticated at turning a profit in an over-traded market.
The down-side of this is that firms have remained uncompetitive internationally as they lack
the economies of scale to produce for major international markets. In addition, the ceaseless
pressure to keep in business has left little time or energy for long-term, coherent planning
or for cooperative ventures. Whereas in the 1960s, rapid economic growth encouraged
unprecedented and often excessive investment in the motor industry, today, the mood is
cautious and pessimistic.39
Some executives argue that there are in fact three motor industry cultures -
production, finance and marketing. The division between them is as old as the industry itself,
though the rise of commerce faculties at universities and technikons has helped to raise the
latter's status. While they are mutually dependent, the three branches have different aims -
the production manager sets out to make the most basic, most easily manufactured vehicle;
the finance manager favours a product which allows the lowest possible capital expenditure
and the highest possible profit margin; the marketing manager wants the widest range of
products with the best possible equipment and at the lowest price.40 The former chief
executive of Toyota argues that marketing people have a different temperament from the
others:
Marketing people are more outgoing, they probably go to more parties, they
entertain more, they probably drink more, and they are not driven by a need
to produce so many vehicles a day. As the late Dr. Ernest Dichter put it,
nearly all sales and marketing people are certifiable neurotics.41
In South Africa until the 1970s, the majority of firms were either production-driven,
following the American and German examples, or finance-driven, in line the British tradition.
Since then, Toyota SA has led the way in focusing the industry's attention on the market.
The company's aim has been to apply "scientific" principles to the distribution, sale and
servicing of vehicles.42 Volkswagen and Mercedes Benz have appointed marketing men as
their managing-directors; Nissan and Toyota itself have separate marketing companies (in
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1991, the Managing-Director of Toyota Marketing, Brand Pretorius, became a part-time
professor of marketing at the University of the Free State). All seven assemblers and a large
swathe of the components industry are now directing their efforts towards customer
satisfaction. The desperate competition for sales is the main motivating factor in this shift;
those who fail will soon disappear. The major assemblers focus much of this marketing effort
on companies, which constitute over 80% of the passenger car market and nearly all of the
commercial vehicle market. The fact that the South Africa market is heavily skewed towards
sales to firms (very few of which are run by women or black people) has probably reinforced
the dominance of white males in management positions in the motor industry.
Within the context of a group defined by class, race and gender, certain key political
and economic attitudes are worth exploring. The first of these is a degree of distance from
the National Party and its erstwhile commitment to apartheid. Before World War II, Ford and
GM followed the American tradition of staying out of politics wherever possible. Stockelbach
and Tuxbury maintained only limited contact with the Board of Trade and Industry and the
Department of Commerce. From the late 1940s, there was a much larger presence of
English-speaking South African and naturalised British managers in the industry. They
included former soldiers, United Party members arid English-speaking civil servants who saw
no future in the state sector after the National Party victory in 1948.43 The rapidly
expanding commercial and industrial sectors absorbed these men; they strengthened the
English-speaking culture of business at a time when government and the bureaucracy were
increasingly Afrikanerised.
So long as government sustained the conditions for growth and profits, the motor
industry accepted the political status quo with all its attendant discrimination and oppression.
On the other hand, the majority of business interests in the motor sector did not provide overt
support for the National Party. The major companies retained a degree of social distance
between themselves and the politicians. The only exceptions have been where Afrikaners
have owned the companies they are running. One example is Datsun-Nissan at Rosslyn,
which was founded by two Afrikaner brothers called Potgieter and later sold to the Messina
and then the Sanlam group. As Chairman of Sanlam in the 1980s, the late Dr. F. du Plessis
tried to influence his acquaintances in government to support his notions of total strategy and
inward industrialisation (he met with strong opposition from the more free market-oriented
head of the Reserve Bank, Dr. de Kock). A further prominent Afrikaner, Albert Wessels,
founded Toyota SA, though from the start, his connections with English-speaking business
community were stronger than his links to the nationalists.44 From the late 1960s, both firms
relied heavily on English-speaking management to run their plants.
The first point of contact between motor companies and the government has always
been the Board of Trade and Industry. Ford and GM first came to South Africa with a
promise from senior government officials that the state would provide inducements for local
assembling. Since then, the Board has attempted to encourage the industry's growth while
preserving free competition between companies in the market place. Managers in the motor
industry have long embraced the notion of a regulated, protected capitalist economy. When
they see their interests threatened by increased government intervention, motor managers take
the high moral ground of free market economics. On the other hand, they have become
equally skilled at highlighting the horrors of foreign "dumping" and the high unemployment
that would result from lower protection. Despite the divisions which the free market-versus-
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regulation issue creates among assemblers and between the vehicle and parts manufacturing
sectors, there is universal acceptance of the need for state intervention to conserve and expand
the industry. One problem facing an incoming, democratic government in South Africa will
be to build on that consensus and bring the state, management and labour together in a
common policy to develop the industry.
v) Management and the Rise of the Trade Unions
Most managers in the motor industry are employees - they may be paid bonuses and
incentives, but they do not actually own the companies they work for.45 In this sense, their
structural position within the capitalist system is closer to the workforce as a whole than to
the owners of the means of production. Despite this, management's collective sense of
identity will not allow them to create common cause with the workers. The separation
between workers and management is visibly reinforced in a number of ways - managers wear
suits instead of overalls; they have offices; they come to work in their own vehicles and park
in reserved bays. Executives are salaried, not hourly paid and they have special medical and
pension schemes.46 More importantly, middle and senior managers see their group interests
as being distinct from those of the proletariat. The success of their careers is dependent on
their companies' performance - if workers resist management orders, then many managers see
them as the enemy. Like all processes within the industry, the antagonistic relationship
between management and workers has a long history.
Management attitudes to labour have shifted significantly since the 1950s. For the
first forty years of the motor industry's history, managers dictated the parameters of labour
relations. An attempt by white workers to establish a union in the 1937 ended in failure -
Ford and GM combined to bring out a strike-breaker from Detroit.47 After World War II,
management continued to set wages and conditions of work unilaterally. For at least one
former labour manager, this was the "a honeymoon period - we didn't know how well off we
were".48 The assemblers paid better than other employers but there was no pressure to
create a bargaining process.
In 1964-5, white workers organised in the Iron, Steel and Allied Workers Union
demanded stop order facilities in the Eastern Cape assembly plants. Management called in
the police and tried to suppress the movement. However, the union mobilised its allies in the
National Party to force the issue; it used job reservation as a threat to make the employers
more compliant. Under pressure from the Department of Labour, the assemblers accepted the
union's formal presence in the plants.49
The white union's successes soon influenced coloured and African workers, whose
numbers in the factories had been growing since the late 1940s. In 1967, coloured workers
formed the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers (Numarwosa) in Port
Elizabeth.50 Six years later, they helped to organise African workers in the United
Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers (UAW).51 Several factors influenced the
management response. For one, managers had found that formal recognition for the white
union had not been cataclysmic - in fact, relations were generally amicable. By contrast, job
reservation had caused discontent among coloured and African workers, and some form of
recognition might help to smooth things over. The late 1960s also saw the beginning of an
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American initiative to develop black leadership potential through the US Leadership Exchange
Programme. Ford and GM actually helped to identify prospective coloured trade union
leaders, some of whom are still active in the labour movement today.52 From 1974, the
pressure from North America grew as the civil rights campaigner, Leon Sullivan, joined the
board of GM and apartheid became an issue in American politics. Internally, Alan de Kock,
author of The Industrial Laws of South Africa and a GM director, persuaded his fellow
managers that an industrial council would help to settle disputes without disrupting
production.33 He was the father of the council established in 1969. Ford, GM, Volkswagen,
the Iron and Steel Union, Numarwosa were full members but the Black Labour Relations
Regulation Act restricted African workers to an ineffectual, indirect representative.54
As managers came into contact with trade unions, they began to accept that negotiated
agreements were not only unavoidable, but even potentially advantageous to their companies.
The fact that unionisation occurred gradually, beginning with whites and extending downward
to lower grade coloured and African workers, made the process all the easier. By the 1970s,
some managers were openly arguing that trade union recognition should be granted to
Africans and that all forms of job reservation, preference policies and apprenticeship
restrictions should be abolished.55 Motor industry executives participated on the Federated
Chamber of Industries' Labour Affairs Committee (created in 1977), which influenced the
Wiehahn Commission's recommendations in favour of liberalising labour law. By that time,
assemblers in the Eastern Cape had already introduced informal recognition agreements with
the UAW.56
Management attitudes towards trade unions did not change at the same pace
throughout the industry. The style of management in the franchised assembly operations of
the Transvaal had traditionally been much harsher. At Datsun in Rosslyn, management
allowed the foremen absolute power over the line workers. The plant employed semi-rural
workers and brought in headmen to reinforce discipline.57 There was no effort to promote
or train Africans beyond the lowest rung of the employment ladder and production was based
on large quantities of cheap labour. Although the situation improved with the importation of
ex-Ford managers from the late 1960s, management's hostility towards organised labour
remained. By 1979, other plants, such as Toyota in Durban and BMW in Rosslyn, had
accepted the rights of workers to join unions. Even so, they avoided recognition agreements
as long as possible and preferred to negotiate on an in-house basis. Managers in some
components firms, especially locally owned companies which were less susceptible to
overseas influences, were often the most reactionary of all.58 They came under an industrial
council as a chapter of the Motor Industry Employers' Association (Samiea). As the
organisation's President noted in 1983, "Our labour structure has worked very satisfactorily
from 1924 to 1979 despite the fact that the Blacks were not part of the statutory
dispensation".59
In the wake of Wiehahn, coloured and African workers formed a united front, first as
Naawu (the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union) and subsequently as part of
Numsa (the National Union of Metalworkers). Since the early 1980s, organised labour has
taken the initiative in industrial relations. 1980-2 saw a massive upsurge in mass strike
action, particularly in the assembly plants. The union was able to compel recalcitrant
assemblers outside the Eastern Cape to sign recognition agreements.60 Employers can no
longer use the law to prevent workers joining trade unions and Numsa has a significant
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presence in the components sector. The changing balance of power has compelled managers
throughout the industry to adapt to the reality of organised labour on the shop floor.
How do managers perceive workers in these new circumstances? Almost all
executives accept that employees have a moral right to collective representation by their own
elected spokespeople. The majority of managers will go further and say that negotiations with
trade unions help to lay down a set of agreed rules, thus eliminating misunderstandings and
disruptions. Some will admit to respecting their opposite numbers in the trade union
movement. On the other hand, many managers regard trade unions as an interfering nuisance:
Twenty years ago, labour relations as a word hardly existed. You just had
workers and they jolly well followed instructions and that was it. I'm not sure
that we haven't gone too far the other way now - it's sometimes quite
ridiculous that you have to discuss every little thing with your union and your
foreman - they're purely management matters. I'm a great believer in the
division of labour.61
Although some firms supported the creation of a National Bargaining Forum in 1990-
1, management with a strong paternalist tradition, such as Toyota, argue that they should be
responsible for their own employees. All managers would like workers to participate more,
in the sense of offering suggestions for improving quality and the organisation of production.
At the same time, most managers still feel they are on the defensive against the power of the
proletariat. They are anxious not to concede real responsibility to employees for fear it will
diminish their own power in the ongoing management/worker conflicts.
The anti-union bias remains strongest amongst managers in the components sector.
In the 1980s, a number of parts firms took the offensive after their first major stoppage. They
actively reduced union power on the shop floor, usually by firing strikers and re-employing
the rank and file.62 Many managers are convinced that the elimination of a minority of
troublemakers will help to solve a company's labour problems. When conflicts reach a head,
a number of companies have thus taken strategic decisions to replace "agitators", even where
this entails extensive retraining.
The labour policies adopted by management are partly informed by their attitudes to
a whole nexus of questions relating to race and gender. The industry as a whole has long
regarded women as best-suited for such work as stitching cloth and leather trim components.
A number of employers in the Transvaal and the Western and Eastern Cape consciously
favour the employment of coloured women in a range of skilled and semi-skilled work. They
argue that coloured women are more reliable - as the primary breadwinners in their families,
managers say they learn more quickly, take more responsibility and have lower absenteeism
rates. By contrast, firms such as ADE, which makes diesel engines, believe women are
poorly suited for shifting heavy objects in the plant.63 Managers at other plants are wary
of introducing female labour for fear of upsetting the strongly male culture on the shop floor.
In terms of race, management at Toyota suggest that the ethnic homogeneity of their
Zulu workforce and their affinity with aspects of Japanese culture (such as work ethic and
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respect for authority) have facilitated the company's appropriation of Japanese production
methods.64 Xhosa-speaking people in the Cape are widely held to be highly politicised and
difficult to manage; Tswana-speakers are reputed to be docile and lacking in initiative. While
managers may initially express these racially-based opinions, further investigation often
reveals an awareness of other important factors in regional differences. They appreciate that
the extent of urbanisation and the style of management affect workers' performance on the
shop floor. Managers are also fully aware that training and education can vastly improve the
capacities of all their workers, regardless of ethnic background. In this context, it may be that
race is used merely as a convenient catchword for more complex explanations. One may
speculate that the register of racism has survived longer than the fears and prejudices which
gave rise to it in the first place.
vi) Conclusion
The culture and perceptions of South African managers in the motor industry have
probably come under a greater range of influences than their counterparts in any other
country. As section (iii) showed, successive waves of foreign investors and management
styles have left their mark in South Africa. For the first twenty years, the American vehicle
manufacturers were unassailable as the dominant force in the motor industry. Then, from the
late 1940s, the British, French, Italians and Germans invested heavily in South Africa and
brought their own management philosophies to this country. The impact of these foreign
influences can still be seen in the strengths and weaknesses of today's motors managers.
More recently, though, the overwhelming strength of Japanese vehicle manufacturers in the
international market has compelled South African managers to examine the very different
management culture which has evolved in that country. Over the next few years, the Japanese
influence may be reinforced through direct investment by the major Japanese motor
manufacturers.
Despite the centrality of foreign ownership and licensing agreements, and the
managers' desire to see themselves as part of the international executive classes, local forces
arising from South African society and political economy have also been crucial in shaping
management consciousness in the motor industry. Section (iv) explored why white males
have retained power in the industry and analysed the central features of management
consciousness as they have emerged in the South African context. It outlined the sense of
common identity which has evolved from a similarity of background and shared interests and
values. Section (v) focused on management responses to the rise of organised labour as the
most important factor in forging changes in management perceptions since the 1960s.
At present, the motor sector in South Africa stands at the crossroads. As the largest
manufacturing industry, it has the potential to play a crucial part in developing the South
African economy. If that is to happen, then government, trade unions, foreign investors and
local managers will have to cooperate on a coherent strategy for growth. The foreign and
domestic influences which have shaped management culture and consciousness will help to
determine what role managers play in building the "new" South Africa. The next decade will
show how the motor men respond to the challenge.
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Appendix: New Passenger and Commercial Vehicle Sales, 1925-1991
Sources: The Wheels of Progress (Felstar: Johannesburg,












































































































































1960 98,779 20,385 119,164
1961 75,938 20,726 96,664
1962 81,308 24,864 106,172
1963 110,468 37,494 147,962
1964 143,373 52,618 195,991
1965 127,898 47,093 174,991
1966 139,076 47,074 186^150
1967 139,223 54,820 194,043
1968 151,546 60,245 211,791
1969 177,945 78,351 256,*296
1970 201,854 95,719 297,573
1971 175,884 119,79B 295,682
1972 182,961 109,316 292,277
1973 229,442 112,941 342,383
1974 226,776 115,151 341,927
1975 229,031 134,574 363,605














1990 209,603 125,171 334,774
1991 197,736 110,339 308,075
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
19B6
19B7
198B
1989
